As a direct e¤ect of the …nancial crisis in 2008, public debt began to accumulate rapidly, eventually leading to the European sovereign debt crisis. However, the dramatic increase in government debt is not only happening in European countries. All major G7 countries are experiencing similar developments. What are the implications of this kind of massive de…cit and debt policy for the long term stability of these economies? Are there limits in debt-ratios that qualitatively change policy options? While theory can easily illustrate these limits, where are these limits in real economies? This paper examines the relationship between sovereign debt dynamics and capital formation, and accounts for the e¤ects of the 2008 …nancial crisis on debt sustainability for the four largest advanced economies. We contribute to the literature on …scal sustainability by framing the problem in an OLG model with government debt, physical capital, endogenous interest rates, and exogenous growth. For the calibration exercise we extract data from the OECD for Germany as a stabilization anchor in Europe, the U.S., the U.K., and Japan for almost two decades before the 2008 crisis. Except for intertemporal preferences all parameters are drawn or directly derived from the OECD database, or endogenously determined within the model. The results of the calibration exercise are alarming for all four countries under consideration. We identify debt ceilings that indicate a sustainable and unsustainable regime. For 2011, all four economies are either close to-, or have already passed the ceiling. The results call for a dramatic re-adjustment in budget policies for a consolidation period and long-term …scal rules that make it possible to sustain su¢ cient capital intensity so that these economies can maintain their high income levels. Current conditions are already starting to restrict policy choices. However, the results also make it very clear that none of these economies would survive a second …nancial crisis such as the one in 2008.
Introduction
The European sovereign debt crisis is the result of the 2008 …nancial crisis. 1 Governments ran up large de…cits in an attept to stabilize the …nancial sector and the real economy. The result was a dramatic increase in net sovereign debt in the years that followed. From 2009 to 2011 net government debt-ratios in many countries increased within just three years more than they had in the three decades before. This dramatic increase in sovereign debt is happening not only in European countries. All major advanced economies (G7) have experienced more or less similar developments ( Figure 1 ). While in the short term government de…cit policies seemed to help to stabilize economic conditions, it is worth considering the implications of such a massive short term de…cit and debt policy for the long term stability of these economies and for policy options in the future. 2 As discussed in Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogo¤ (2012), due to high debt-ratios there may be future costs in terms of a capital reduction process. These long term costs need to be weighed against Keynesian short-term …scal stimulus policies. Is there more than an intergenerational distribution e¤ect? Are there limits where the level of debt qualitatively changes policy options because the economy is drifting o¤ into an unstable dynamic regime? Are there limits to government intervention policies due to an unsustainable debt regime?
While these limits can be easily identi…ed just by looking at dynamic stock ‡ow interactions and budget constraints, the important question is: where are these limits in reality? Is a theoretically unsustainable sovereign debt scenario, de…ned as moving onto an unstable debt and capital trajectory that ends with the collapse of the economy, relevant for real economies?
It seems likely that the European debt crisis is a sign that Southern European economies have already crossed the line of unsustainable sovereign debtratios. While Southern European countries experienced strongly increasing interest spreads indicating a growing threat of default risk, Northern European countries, in particular Germany and the U.K., are regarded as a kind of safe haven. Two major questions are hence arising.
1. Are Europe's northern economies which are perceived as strong and stable, still on a sustainable debt regime, or have they already become vulnerable?
2. The dramatic increase in sovereign debt in all G7 (not Canada) countries suggests a closer look at non-European countries. Are there indicators that the current sovereign debt positions of major G7 economies are hitting sovereign debt limits, which could destabilize these economies in the longer term? Could there be a global sovereign debt crisis on the horizon?
We choose four major economies to examine whether a critical (unsustain- 1 Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011) …nd that …nancial crises often percede or accompany debt crises. Causality may run in both directions. See also Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) . 2 Patillo et al. (2011) , among others, show that there is a non-linear relationship between GDP growth and external debt. In particular, they …nd a threshold beyond which more dept a¤ects growth negatively. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) argue that this relatioship is weak for low debt to GDP ratios. able, macroeconomically unstable) debt-ratio has already been reached. We choose Germany to link the discussion of the Euro debt crisis to a discussion of global sovereign debt problems. Germany is regarded as the major stabilizing economy in the eurozone, owing to both its size and its …scal resilience. Germany is expected to be able to take on large shares of Southern European debt (by guarantees, sinking funds or other instruments) to reduce interest spreads as well as the interest burdens of Southern European governments, and in so doing, stabilize these economies. The U.K. is in scope because it is the largest economy in the EU outside the eurozone and, as a G7 member, one of the world's major advanced economies. The U.S. is the world's largest economy and in many cases serves as a benchmark economy. The U.S. was also the economy that triggered the …nancial crisis. Japan, as the second largest advanced economy, is the most puzzling but possibly the most interesting case. Japan has been running an expansionary macro policy, in both monetary and …scal de…cit terms, for almost two decades which has resulted in a tremendous sovereign debt position. So even if Japan is very di¢ cult to understand fully we at least try to look at its debt conditions.
Even if the question of debt sustainability has been discussed in the literature in various ways (for a brief discussion see the next section), so far no contribution has assessed the e¤ects of the 2008 crisis, with the massive change in debt position in the aftermath, on long term debt sustainability using a calibration exercise. Since an econometric analysis has to rely on ex post data, the sustainability of current debt-ratios cannot be analyzed on this basis, even though this question urgently requires an answer. Therefore, we choose another approach.
To assess …scal sustainability under today's macro conditions we return to a very rudimentary, but robust dynamic macro theory. We use a simple OLG approach to theoretically assess conditions for …scal sustainability and calibrate this model in the most straightforward way. Despite relying on an OLG framework, we are con…dent that the most important results are essentially driven by accounting restrictions and less by potentially controversial elements of decision models. In the calibration exercise we use OECD data to endogenously derive all required parameters and variables. Only two variables indicating time preferences are exogenous. Hence, we can assess debt dynamics and debt sustainability with the help of a very fundamental model and a consistent calibration exercise.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates the de…ned question to the literature. Section 3 introduces the framework of a simple OLG model. In section 4 we analyze the dynamics of the macroeconomic system, de…ne the notion of sustainability as used in this paper, and derive the tools to assess the sustainability of …scal regimes for calibration. Section 5 is devoted to the calibration exercise and provides policy interpretations and implications. Section 6 summarizes the main results and concludes. 3 
Related Literature
A reappraisal of the economic literature reveals that the formal examination of sustainable debt is challenged by the absence of a common de…nition of debt sustainability. The de…nition of debt sustainability used in empirical studies relies, in one form or another, on a set of binding conditions concerning the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Nevertheless, the empirical strand of literature has yet to deliver conclusive and consistent results due to di¤erences in the econometric methodology. In the spirit of Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Threhan and Walsh (1988) , the common practice is to examine if government debt or de…cit follow a stationary process. In Quintos (1995) sustainability requires de…cit stationarity in the di¤erences. Blanchard et al. (1990) adopt a more relaxing measure, in which a tax-rate, which ensures that the growth in debt/GDP ratio does not exceed the interest-growth di¤erential (the di¤erence between the real interest rate and the growth rate), is used to identify sustainable …scal policies in OECD countries between 1979 and 1999. The absence of a limit on the debt/GDP ratio implies that permanently increasing debt/GDP ratios are sustainable as long as the former inequality condition holds. 3 Another common empirical practice is to rely on cointegration tests between government spending and revenues. In a more recent empirical study, Afonso and Rault (2010) examine the …scal sustainability of the 15 EU member countries prior to 2001 over the period 1970-2006 using both stationarity and cointragration tests. The ful…llment of the sustainability condition requires that the present value of the future stream of primary surpluses as a share of national income matches the value of the outstanding stock of debt, which was the case for the 15 EU members as a whole. Similary, Bajo-Rubio et al. (2010) con…rm a sustainable …scal regime for Spain for the period 1850-2000 solely using cointegration tests. A feature of the empirical literature is, as already mentioned, that the results related to sustainability solely derive from the government's intertemporal budget constraint, and thus are disadvantageous in that they cannot capture the e¤ects which …scal policy itself has on the wider economy, i.e., on interest rates, market expectations, and output.
The limitations of the above studies call for a di¤erent approach -one which is able to capture the interaction between the private and public sectors through its e¤ects on macroeconomic variables. As already mentioned, the lack of a common de…nition of debt sustainability is one of the main reasons for the absence of an established, conventional framework. Another obstacle derives from the di¤erent schools of thought in economics. Recent followers of Keynes' view of sustainable debt issues are Aspromourgos, Rees, and White (2009), whose study establishes that permanent primary de…cits are sustainable in the presence of in ‡ation-driven strategies. In Furceri and Mourougane (2010) the trade-o¤ between economic growth and crowding-out e¤ects of …scal expansionary policy are analyzed in a more complex model, where short-term interest rates are set by monetary decisions following the Taylor type rule. The results of a calibration exercise, that models a temporary increase in public consumption of 1% of GDP, imply that bene…ts from the increase in short-term activity can outweigh the increase in the debt/GDP ratio, so it is an e¤ective short-term measure to support activity.
Following neoclassical growth theory, Diamond (1965) developed an overlapping generations model (OLG) of exogenous growth, which inspired the literature to depart from the traditional present budget balance perspective in favor of a life-cycle model. It has become the basic framework of the neoclassical approach for identifying and investigating the deeper structural determinants of …scal sustainability and is largely split into de…cit and debt sustainability issues. For example, Masson (1985) examines the sustainability of primary de…cits with a two-period OLG under uncertainty to show that the dynamic ine¢ ciency condition -which requires the long-term interest rate to be below the growth rate -does not ensure a sustainable constant primary de…cit-to-output ratio. The model is calibrated with arbitrary parameter values to show a possible resulting path for interest rates. Similarly, Nielson (1992) gives conditions for a sustainable primary de…cit in a rudimentary closed-version growth model but with in…nite overlapping families. The dynamic ine¢ ciency condition ensures a sustainable primary de…cit only for high-growth economies and under very restrictive conditions, namely with modest-sized public sectors relative to GDP, low interest rates, a high capital's factor share in production and a low rate of time preference. The e¤ects of …scal expansions and contractions on the model responses as well as a calibration exercise are left open for further discussion. Chalk (2000) contributes to the literature on de…cit sustainability by numerically deriving the theoretical limit to the maximal sustainable bond-…nanced de…cit implied by a two-period OLG model. As opposed to Blanchard et al. (1990) governments cannot rely on negative interest-growth di¤erentials to run a Ponzi-game. Instead, Chalk (2000) identi…es a limit on the size of sustainable de…cits which occurs at the ine¢ ciency condition; that is, before the interest rate exceeds the growth rate. The notable contribution of Chalk (2000) is the calibration of the model to match annual facts of the U.S. economy from . The calibration results show de…cit limits of about 5% of GDP. Azariadis and Reichlin (1996) use a two-period life-cycle model to analyze the e¤ect of public debt on the dynamics of OLG economies with production externalities rather than focusing on the sustainability issues per se. Nevertheless, initial positive levels of public debt are shown to be responsible for low-level development traps and thus become implicitly linked to sustainability issues. De la Croix and Michel (2002) investigate the e¤ects of the introduction of public debt on the dynamic properties of a two-period OLG model to derive conditions for ensuring debt rather than de…cit sustainability. Ranking and Ro¢ a (2003) con…rm the robustness of the 'interior maximum'solution for a closed economy to both Cobb-Douglas and CES utility functions. Despite the fact it does not include a calibration exercise, it gives valuable insights concerning the existence of a maximum sustainable debt level. Voyvoda and Yeldan (2005) develop an OLG, small open-economy model of exogenous growth to study the growth and wel-fare e¤ects of Turkey's 2001 austerity program (TTSE). Similarly to the present paper, they approach the calibration exercise with a baseline scenario and expose it to exogenous growth shocks in order to illustrate possible adjustment patterns. The results of the exercise expose the TTSE program to large welfare and growth de…ciencies and suggest the adaptation of other …scal programs.
It must be noted that exogenous growth is not alone in the life-cycle strand of literature on debt sustainability issues. Following the seminal work of Lucas (1988) , and Diamond's (1965) life-cycle model, Moraga and Vidal (2004) assess the e¤ect of budgetary imbalances on the dynamics of the economy and the outlook for economic growth in an OLG framework with an endogenous growth model of the human capital type. The notable contribution of Moraga and Vidal (2004) is the model's calibration exercise to the three-period OLG model used to simulate the e¤ects of Europe's demographic shock, which shows how the shock can lead to unsustainable debt levels in the absence of constant debt policy rules. Annicchiarico and Giammarioli (2004) employ a two-period OLG framework with endogenous growth of the learning-by-doing type to study the path of convergence of an economy towards well-de…ned …scal targets. A simulation exercise illustrates the e¤ect of di¤erent …scal variables on the dynamics of the rate of growth of the economy along the adjustment process towards the longrun equilibrium. Braunigner (2005) examines the existence of permanent budget de…cits in an OLG framework of endogenous growth. A limit on the sustainable overall de…cit/GDP ratio ensures the existence of two steady states. Creel and Saraceno (2008) calibrate a simple non-OLG endogenous growth model to U.S., French and U.K. data to …nd the public spending to capital ratio which maximizes growth. The calibration results show that the three countries are below the optimal level of spending, when spending positively enters the production function. Contrary to the present paper, the variables in the calibration exercise are in capital as opposed to GDP ratios. In the form of a Ramsey-Swan endogenous growth model, Greiner (2011) analyzes the sustainability of budget balances and permanent budget de…cits but not in an OLG framework. The debt management rule requires the primary surplus/GDP ratio to be a positive linear funtion of present and accumulated debt. Furthermore, the results of a simulation exercise show that permanent de…cits are unsustainable. Despite the fact the results of the above papers derive from endogenous growth, the aim of the papers is to some extent to give a rationale for the implementation of …scal rules to preserve sustainability. It hence supports the motivation of this paper's investigation.
The above discussion of recent literature on …scal sustainability has identi…ed the neoclassical OLG approach as a solid theoretical framework for long-run policy planning. The discussion also reveals how this paper can contribute to the mainstream of this strand of literature with the numerical identi…cation of a debt/GDP limit by means of a calibration exercise. Furthermore, it should provide …scal policy makers with an indicator for the consequences of uncontrolled debt ratios.
A Simple Economy
The structure of the economy takes the form of a two-period overlapping generation (OLG) model of government debt and physical capital in line with Diamond (1965) . In this model we choose a speci…cation similar to Ranking and Ro¢ a (2003) and Farmer and Zotti (2010) , where a maximum level of sustainable debt 4 is shown to exist at a point of non-degeneracy capital-ratio k 6 = 0 in both closed-and open-economy versions, respectively. Motivated by these resultswhere a 'constant stock of government debt'policy may not be su¢ cient for …s-cal sustainability once these levels are surpassed -we develop and calibrate an OLG model of exogenous growth to a parameterization that can more plausibly be matched to actual data. Apart from the CES intertemporal utility function the notable di¤erence in our model is the inclusion of bequest activities, which allow us to relate the discussion to the present debt and de…cit values.
Before we proceed with the formal modeling a few remarks regarding the model's speci…cation should be made. Firstly, there is no money in this model, only real debt. Secondly, it takes place in a non-stochastic world, 5 as it is argued that 'the results will not be changed by introducing uncertainty' (Chalk 2000, p. 298) . Finally, as we wish to perform a calibration exercise, we present the model in discrete time. We do not intend to analyze the impact of debt itself; rather, we make use of the established tools and results of prior studies to examine the …scal sustainability of our selection of advanced economies.
The Firm
In each period t, production occurs according to a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function. Perfectly competitive …rms employ two factors of production, capital services K t and labor services L t ; scaled by A > 0 to produce output Y t :
where H t = h t L t denotes e¢ ciency-weighted labor input, with 0 < h t being the labor productivity per employee. As we do not analyze systematic changes in labor participation and unemployment rates, labor input moves along with population growth and can be normalized (L t = N t ) : Production elasticity of physical capital is denoted by (0; 1) and of labor 1 , respectively. Production per labor in e¢ ciency units is then
. In order to write the model in terms of 'income ratios'instead of e¢ ciency units 6 we need to rewrite the production function as 4 Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogo¤ (2012) identify a 90% debt/ GDP threshold, above which there is a negative causal relationship between high debt and growth. Although their study takes a di¤erent approach, their long-term robust results con…rm; (1) the crowding-out mechanism behind the present paper's theoretical model, and (2) the existence of a maximum debt ratio. 5 See for e.g., Masson (1985) for a related OLG model under uncertainty. 6 We prefer writting intensity ratios in terms of income due to the obvious advantages linked with the calibration exercise. For identical arguments see Chalk (2000, p.304).
where k t = K t =Y t is de…ned as the capital-ratio (more precise capital/outputratio). From pro…t maximization we obtain the net return on physical capital
and the wages per labor e¢ ciency unit w t as
The Consumer
As usual, the two generations are assumed to overlap in each period t: Population grows at an exogenously given rate n: New generations of size N t enter the economy at date t and live for two lifetime periods, working during the …rst and retiring and living o¤ their savings during the second. Households are identical within and across generations. Speci…cally, their preferences depend on a intertemporal CES utility function u over consumption per e¢ ciency unit in both lifetime periods (c
where the superscript stands for each generation's lifetime period and and are the usual parameters of CES utility. During the …rst lifetime period the young generation allocates wage income per labor in e¢ ciency units to consumption c 1 t and transfers consumption between periods t and t+1 by saving s t to receive (1 + i t )s t , in exchange, where i t is the real interest rate in t. The old generation spends all savings on consumption c 2 t+1 in the second lifetime period. Furthermore, we assume that the old generation bequeaths the total capital K t and bonds B t with the share if total bequest does not restrict full capital transfer. 7 Hence, this intergenerational transfer of stocks does not explicitly e¤ect the savings ( ‡ow) decision. In addition, the government levies taxes per wage income at rate t in the …rst period so that total income is reduced by the tax burden, given the disposable wage income w t (1 t ). 8 A representative consumer maximizes utility of consumption from their income per e¢ ciency unit subject to their budget constraints:
From the …rst order conditions we obtain 1 + i t = 1 c 2 t+1
: Inserting the budget constraints and re-arranging gives the household's savings rate 9 s (savings per income):
with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ' = 1 +1 : Note that CES utility allows for a change in savings rates when interest rates change. Depending on the elasticity of substitution, the savings rate may increase (' > 1) or decrease (' < 1) with an increasing interest rate. For (' = 1) we obtain a constant savings rate independent of of the interest rate.
The Public Sector
Let B t be the net value of government debt at the start of period t. Furthermore, the government levies taxes T t ; and consumes G t . In addition, the government reimburses outstanding debt B t with the accrued interest on government debt i t . Interest is payable during period t. Existing debt is re…nanced each period, and total government de…cit is …nanced by issuing new bonds. Hence, rewriting total debt accumulation 'debt-ratio' b t := B t =Y t ; de…nes each period´s debt accumulation per unit of output with the following …rst order di¤erence equation in b t :
Yt and t = Tt Yt being the primary de…cit-ratio, government expenditure-ratio, and tax rate, respectively. t denotes the growth factor of output which in a potential steady state becomes equal to the product of the population growth factor (1 + n) and the growth factor of labor productivity (1 + " t ) ; such that t = (1 + " t ) (1 + n t ).
Equilibrium and Stationary Conditions 1 Asset market no-arbitrage condition
We assume the two assets, public debt and productive capital, to be perfect substitutes from the investor´s perspective. The no arbitrage condition equals 9 See the di¤erence to Ranking and Ro¢ a (2003), p. 222. 9 the real return on public debt i t and the real net return of productive capital r t :
where denotes the depreciation rate of physical capital. 10 2 The government's …scal rule: 'constant debt-ratio rule'
As a necessary condition for a long term sustainable government budget policy we need to establish a …scal rule for the primary de…cit-ratio d t . Unless governments want a permanently increasing debt/GDP ratio 11 it must …x the debt/output-ratio (hereafter 'debt-ratio') at a desired level. Hence, this chosen debt-ratio must remain constant (or at least not increase systematically) over time so that b t+1 = b t for all t.
12 This condition implies for society that government debt will neither automatically disappear over time as a relevant resource absorbing element (b t+1 < b t ), nor will it become an increasing and eventually overwhelming burden on future generations. Implementing this …s-cal rule implies for (6) that the primary surplus d t must exactly cover the interest payments on outstanding debt. Hence, it holds that
This 'constant debt ratio rule'implies that in case g t is chosen by the government the lump-sum tax rate t becomes endogenously determined to satisfy t = g t +(1+i t )b t . 13 Recall that negative interest-growth di¤erentials (i t < 1) allows governments to run up primary de…cits (g > t) while maintaining a constant b. Notwithstanding the validity of the latter in the short-term, the theoretical literature discussed above has identi…ed dynamic ine¢ cient-driven policies as unsustainable in the long-run.
3 Asset market equilibrium and real capital accumulation Asset markets clear in period t whenever the sum of the supply of resources by the …rst generation of households s t ; the exogenous international capital in ‡ow rate 14 f; and the total bequest (k t + b t ) equals the next generation's total demand for both public debt B t+1 =Y t and private capital K t+1 =Y t . Formally, in GDP ratios we have:
4 Qualitative Dynamic Analysis
Stationary Economy under Constant Debt-Ratio Rule
Stationarity in this setting contains two elements: (i) the constant debt-ratio rule (as …scla rule) so that debt-ratios do not systematically change over and b t+1 = b t , and (ii) for the real economy stationary capital-ratio as well as the growth rate remain constant over time so that (k t+1 = k t ) and ( t+1 = ).
That is, we derive a curve for all potential simultaneous stationary states in this economy with respect to b t and k t ; and therefore derive a locus of stationary debt-ratios which can be supported by stationary capital-ratios.
The general dynamics of capital-ratio, k t : Under the 'constant debt-ratio rule' capital-ratio dynamics are restricted to this …scal rule (8) and hence 16 can be described as
If the government implements a "constant debt-ratio rule", there exists a stationary sovereign debt-ratio b s t for each stationary capital-ratio k t > 0.
The stationary debt curve, 'b s t -curve', has a maximum b max t which denotes the maximum debt-ratio the economy can maintain. Non stationary dynamics is described by The stability of the economy can be discussed by looking at the four areas of adjustment: A; B; C; D. The arrows show how the economy adjusts if debt is higher or lower than the stationary value. If at the current capital-ratio k t the government chooses a debt-ratio below the b s t -curve (area A), the economy will adjust towards a higher capital intensity and move steadily to the right until the b s t -curve is reached. In the case where the government chooses a debtratio above the b s t -curve for a given k t , like in areas B; C and D; the economy, embarking on its own law of motion, will reduce capital intensity and move to the left. The above adjustment process will lead to two qualitatively di¤erent stability regimes. The existence of a maximum on the stationary debt curve and the adjustment pattern have important implications for the ability of the economy to maintain a desired debt ratio.
De…nition 2 (Sustainable Debt-Ratio) : A debt-ratio b t is 'sustainable' if a policy of a 'constant debt-ratio rule' for b t leads towards a stable stationary, strictly positive capital-ratio, 0 < k b t Proposition 3 According to de…nition (1) areas A and B in Figure 2 describe conditions for a sustainable debt while areas C and D describe conditions of unsustainable debt.
The policy implications of a sustainable or unsustainable regime are dramatic. (i) In a sustainable debt regime …scal policy-makers have the freedom to choose, for whatever current policy purpose, the desired ratio of debt within the limits of the sustainable regime. (ii) Policy-makers must be aware of their limited choices. If they do not want to push the economy onto an unstable trajectory, which may lead to a degenerating capital process and an eventual collapse, they are not completely free to implement …scal expansionary measures. (iii) Once the sustainable debt limit b max has been surpassed, the freedom of choice turns into a forced policy of long term stabilization. Even if current short term conditions suggest expansionary …scal policies the unstable trajectory needs to be maintained. The longer the economy moves on this unstable path, the stronger will be the pressure to return to a sustainable regime. The freedom of action turns into a pressure to react even under unfavorable conditions.
Calibrating the model
The calibration of overlapping generations has been gradually taken up by a series of papers and is well established in the literature. Yet to the authors' best knowledge none of these exercises have been parameterized to consider (1) the e¤ect of the latest …nancial crisis with a massive de…cit policy and the most recent debt accumulation, and (2) a potential sustainability problem of the world's largest advanced economies in its aftermath. While the debt crisis is so far seen as a problem of Europe's periphery economies, this exercise should shed more light on the debt position of the largest advanced economies, and hence reveal global threats generated by reaching upper debt thresholds.
At this point we wish to reiterate these calibration exercises since they have a number of shortcomings and should hence be seen as an instrument of broad analysis and a source of orientation rather than precise predictions. Furthermore, the resulting scenarios may be sensitive to changes in assumptions and parameter values. Despite the latter, we strongly believe that the results obtained through this tool are valuable and of immediate importance to policy-makers in light of the unprecedented speed of the recent debt accumulation which makes this issue one of extreme urgency. As this discussion seems not to have escaped recent publications, our aim is to identify the recent problem of unsustainable debt using a broad but also quick calibration exercise. 1) As usual, 18 we start with a baseline scenario that covers two major ideas as far as possible: (i) for the time before the 2008 crisis we want to identify the characteristics of the real economy suggested by the model for the four largest advanced economies, namely Germany, the U.S., Japan, and the U.K.; (ii) we select a period that can be considered stationary for the real economy and simultaneously stationary (closest to a following a constant debt-ratio policy) with respect to the …scal regime. 19 In other words, we use an episode where a simultaneously stationary private economy can maintain a constant debt rule, and hence a …scal regime with a non accelerating debt-ratio that can support a stationary private economy.
2) With the help of the baseline scenario we discuss whether the four economies have drifted on unstable debt and capital trajectories in the aftermath of the …nancial crisis 3) If an economy faces the conditions of unsustainable debt, what is required to return to a stable and hence sustainable debt trajectory?
Baseline Scenario

Baseline Period
Concept of stationarity: The purpose of the baseline scenario is to bring the economies to a base-period which re ‡ects the latest potential 'long-term stationarity period'of the respective country. Guided by the concept of the model we look at (i) stationarity in the real economy and (ii) stationarity in debt behavior. Stationarity in the real economy is indicated by a rather stationary capital-ratio (k), and a stationary real growth factor ( ). A …scal regime, according to the model, is considered as stationary if the constant debt rule (8) holds.
Database: For consistency and comparability we exclusively rely on the OECD data base (for details see below). Even if this is the most comprehensive international data base available with respect to the relevant macro data we are aware that we are restricted to some extent. However, we will compute all parameters that are not available in the OECD database by endogenously using the equations of the theoretical model. Only intertemporal preferences are exogenous. The …rst data for Germany is available from 1991 onwards, after reuni…cation. Therefore, we tried to cover the period 1991 to 2007. However, for the U.K. and Germany capital data (tangible …xed asset) 20 are not available before 1995, and for Japan not before 2001.
2 0 Since data availability and the identi…cation of a baseline period depends on the capital concept, this interaction needs to be brie ‡y discussed. The longest time period available for indicating real capital, as a productive capital in the production process of the model, for a capital concept that the OECD economic outlook calls 'productive capital'. Hence, this variable is our …rst choice for 'capital' to identify a stationary capital output ratio for 1991 to 2007. However, we know that 'productive capital' is only a fraction of total capital input in the aggregate production process. In particular, housing capital is an important additional element of …xed capital and capital accumulation. Therefore, if housing is excluded from the calibration data we do not have consistent budget constraints, and might run into the problem of generating biased results in terms of a larger gross return on capital. E.g., for the U.K. the 'tangible …xed capital ratio' including dwellings is more than 2.5 times higher than a capital measure excluding dwellings. Hence, using a measure of capital that excludes dwelling will lead to an inconsistent budget constraint and overestimate the gross return on capital. As the variables are directly computed from the model, we are forced to address this problem by using the capital concept 'tangible …xed assets'from the national accounts of the OECD. Finding stationarity for 'productive capital'for 1991 to 2007 (for the U. K. 1988-2007) and being restricted to the period 1995 to 2007 for 'tanglible …xed assets' we regard this sub-period, too, as stationary, even if we cannot apply respective tests and provide statistical support due to shortage of data.
Identi…cation of stationary periods for Germany, U.S., and the U.K.: During the whole period of 1991-2007, 'productive capital-ratio'and GDP growth rates were statistically stationary 21 . However, even if 'productive capital'in the OECD de…nition is closest to the concept of capital in an industry production function we must take into account that productive capital is only a fraction of total capital input in an economy wide aggregate process. In particular, housing is quantitatively important so we have to extend the capital concept to the concept of tangible …xed assets. However, data availability Table 1 .
22
Identi…cation of the stationary period for Japan: While Japan's real economy 23 seemed stationary with respect to productive capital-ratio and the growth factor during the period from 1991 to 2007, the most recent 'constant debt-ratio' …scal regime was between 1988 and 1992. 24 We hence decided to take the most recent period available in terms of appropriate asset data which is 2001 to 2007. We therefore combine data for the real economy for the period 2001 to 2007 with the latest period of constant debt policy, which was 1988 to 1993.
Note that with these benchmark periods we choose optimistic conditions in terms of the debt regime. Since the initial levels of debt are crucial when comparing and determining sustainable de…cit policies, (see Chalk 2000, p. 294), we were forced to select optimistic periods as these were the only periods during the last 20 years in which debt did not substantially grow.
Extracted Variables, Calculated Parameters, and Baseline Scenario
As we have already written the theoretical model in output-ratios instead of the customary 'labor in e¢ ciency-ratios', 25 we now have the obvious advantages of using empirically available GDP ratios for the calibration exercise. The results 2 1 ADF and PP tests show stationarity for the U.S., U.K., and Germany. For the U.K. we obtain this result for 1988-2007. 2 2 This statement is not precise with respect to the relative prices of dwellings in the U.K. In the U.K. there was a signi…cant and ongoing relative price increase in dwellings particular after 2000 that a¤fected tangible assets. This is also true for the United States. 2 3 According to statistical stationarity tests productive capital and were stationary for 1991 to 2007.based on GDP-ratios endow policy-makers with easy interpretations and economically meaningful …gures. With that in mind, we next describe the economic variables extracted from the OECD data set and the endogenously determined parameters which, according to the model, support the stationary period. For more details about the selected variables see the tables in Appendix 2. In order to determine the values that are not in the OECD statistics for the de…ned period we need to exogenously choose plausible values for the unobservable parameters for intertemporal consumer preferences and '. Since is the weight at which a consumer evaluates today's consumption, and 1 is the next period´s consumption weight, we suggest the most conservative scheme with equal weights (1 = = 0:5). This scheme regards future consumption as equally important to today's consumption and hence increases savings as much as possible. Realistically we would expect 1 < ; however, because we hardly observe these values and we would like to describe an optimistic savings behavior, we suggest 0:5 for these values. For ', the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, we assume 0 '. For ' < 1 substitution is very low, while for ' > 1 it is high. The theory implies that a reduction in real interest rates increases the consumers' savings rate if 1 > ' and savings react negatively to increasing interest. If 1 > ' then the savings react positively to rising interest rates. In order to cover both scenarios we calculate three cases (i) ' = 0:5, (ii) ' = 1:5 and also (iii) ' = 1; which is the Cobb Douglas utility case, leading to a constant savings rate. Further, for each of the cases we need to identify the share of government debt that is passed to the young generation . This parameter is determined by solving the modeled system at steady state values (11) of this parameter.
Looking at Table 1 we see that the variables computed from the model equations are realistic enough to suggest a real behavior of the economies. Although we have a very simple model we obtain broad 'rule of thumb' parameter values that are within the range of what we would expect to see. It is particularly interesting to note that Japan, which has a very di¤erent monetary regime compared to the other three economies, with very low nominal interest rates and a de ‡ationary process, has similar parameter values in real terms. Hence, the Japanese real economy seems to work conventionally under the veil of unconventional monetary conditions.
Unsustainable Debt Trajectories
With the help of the baseline scenario we discuss whether the four economies under consideration may be moving onto unstable trajectories. In order to 2 7 Nominal rate minus p.c. rate of change of GDP de ‡ator. 2 8 To derive these variable values, equations from the theoretical model were used to calculate the values of the respective variables using OECD data. For details see appendix 2. identify unsustainable debt conditions we look at two indicators. First, we look partially at public sector behavior and verify whether governments are following a constant or reducing debt-ratio rule. Second, we look at the macro conditions and examine wether an economy is moving on a non degenerating trajectory towards a capital-ratio strictly larger than zero once governments applied a constant debt rule at the current debt-ratio.
Deviation from the Constant Debt-Ratio Rule
The …rst indication of an unsustainable debt development is whether the constant debt-ratio rule is met at each debt ratio. Therefore, we take the rule (8) and the values from the stationary period (in particular the real interest rates and growth rates) and compute the de…cit policy required to match the constant debt-ratio rule. The results are presented in Figure 3 . In this …gure the solid line denotes the primary budget surplus that is required at each year's debt ratio to match condition (8) , while the solid line describes the actual primary surplus in the respective year. The dotted line denotes the primary surplus as a ratio of potential GDP as published by the OECD. We can see that during the last two decades this partial criterion is met only during the episode we have identi…ed as being closest to stationarity, and hence serves as baseline period. Without this exceptional episode all four economies could not establish a …scal regime capable of supporting a stationary debt-ratio. This very simple indicator merely tells us that the considered economies are moving on a long term path rising debt ratio.
Unsustainable Sovereign Debt-Trajectories
While the conditions discussed in the previous section are partial and constitute rather simple views on constant debt-ratio budget rules, we can also take a look at the full economic environment.
As suggested in de…nition 1, a debt level b t is 'sustainable'if a 'constant debt rule policy' for the given debt level steadily moves towards a strictly positive stationary capital ratio (0 < k b t ) without a change in …scal rule. In …gure 2, to maintain a constant debt to GDP ratio without a change in the …scal rule the economy has to be below the b s t -curve or below the maximum of this curve. Region A and B in Figure 2 support a sustainable debt development. At primary de…cit levels above the maximum of this curve, region C and D in Figure 2 , we obtain an unstable permanent increase in the debt ratio or a decrease in the capital ratio.
In Figure 4 we compute the stationary curves for various values of ' and identify the sustainable regions for the economies under consideration. We see that all economies are either above or close to an unsustainable trajectory. None of the conditions in the U.S., Europe, and Japan are comparable of supporting a sustainable debt development. To illustrate the e¤ects of the relative increase in housing prices 33 we also calculate the 2011 ratios for an adjusted relative housing price. 34 Hence, all of these economies are presently playing, or are close to playing a Ponzi scheme. Even if they have not crossed the line to an unsustainable regime the capital-ratio that eventually supported the current debt-ratio would become very low. Hence, the current debt ratios would clearly lead to a strong reduction in capital intensity of the production process in the long term. However, what is the policy implication of this …nding?
First, the world's largest economies and in particular their …scal and debt regimes are not at all as sound as their governments claim. Due to the enormity of the …nancial crisis the governments' ability to stabilize and manage macro conditions has reached or is close to an absolute limit, rendering governments and indeed the entire economies vulnerable. While the US, the U.K., and Japan are able to react independently this …nding is particular delicate for Germany. Germany is regarded as the stabilizing anchor in the eurozone that is able to stabilize other European economies by absorbing (or give warantees on) other countries' debt. In a later section we will see that Germany's adjustment requirements are indeed less dramatic than in the other considered economies. However, there are already substantial hidden liabilities for Germany, too, that are not accounted for in this analysis. Even if Germany seems the soundest economy in the eurozone the results indicate that Germany, too, has reached its limits. If the anchor slips onto an unsustainable trajectory the entire region may fall victim to instability.
Passing this debt ceiling changes conditions for making policy. If a government does not change its de…cit policies to return to a sustainable trajectory the growth path becomes unstable and the economy will not be able to maintain its capital-ratio. Policy-makers have lost the freedom to use de…cit policy tools for its desired policies, unless they take the risk that the economy will degenerate. This kind of restrictions in the ability to choose adequate policies is already apparent. The present downturn in general macroeconomic activity may indicate a call for a more stabilizing de…cit policy. However, as the sustainable debt limits are reached, the risk of long term destabilization is apparent, and policy choice is reduced. Furthermore, these …ndings make clear that none of the economies would survive a second shock similar to that of the 2008 …nancial crisis.
Under these conditions governments come under pressure to implement the necessary anti-de…cit policies to stabilize the economy or to take unconventional measures. It seems obvious that the required policies will be more dramatic the larger the di¤erence between the current debt level and a sustainable path. In general we also observe that government disbursement-ratios have dramatically increased since the baseline period, (e.g. US: 7.04 pc.pts., U.K.: 7.73 pc.pts, Japan: 11.21 pc.pts). Hence, for the economies under consideration we identify clear di¤erences in the necessary e¤orts to return to a sustainable regime. These e¤orts can be rather painful, requiring large cuts in expenditure or a rise in taxes. As a result unconventional measures, such as reducing real debt by in ‡ating nominal values or introducing new legislation to reduce real debt, are becoming more likely in order to return to a sustainable debt trajectory.
Conventional and Unconventional Adjustment Policies
Conventional Adjustment Policies: Having established that all economies face conditions that are likely to be unsustainable, we can determine the adjustments required to return to a stable and hence sustainable debt trajectory. While all economies are currently on or close to an unstable trajectory, the required policy will be the more dramatic the larger the di¤erence between the current debt level and a sustainable path and the slower the stationary growth. Hence, for the economies under consideration we identify clear di¤erences in the required e¤ort to return to a sustainable regime. For simplicity we calculate the de…cit policy and trajectory that may allow te economies to return to a sustainable debt condition. To determine a policy scenario the government chooses a debt level that is sustainable, which is the eventually desired debt-ratio. We call this level debt target b : For a historically given debt level b t the government must implement a sequence of primary budget policies d t to reach the target level b after a chosen number of periods :
Again, as the following part can be no more than a discussion of rules of thumb we keep things as simple as possible. We assume (i) for the real economy to return to conditions of the baseline period as kind of stationary description of the economy (see values in Table 1 ). This assumption is probably critical because it seems, from the current perspective, quite optimistic. However, if the identi…ed baseline period really re ‡ects the long term potentials of the economy, and if this period is not just another bubble in important parts of the economy, or if the 2008 crisis has not destroyed these long term potentials, then the assumption of a return pre-crisis conditons is consistent. We (ii) take the constant debt …scal regime of the stationary period as the point of departure for each country. That is, for this period we assume that the expenditure-ratio and the tax-ratio are at non exceptional levels (values are given in Tables 1 and 2 ). (iii)
For de…cit consolidation policies we decide to freeze the expenditure rate of this period to the desired ratio and determine the change in expenditure required to return from the current ratio to the ratio of the baseline period (Table 2) . When considering de…cit adjustments we concentrate on expenditure di¤erentials and not on revenue di¤erentials because they are less dependent on uncontrolled macroeconomic conditions and more determined by active policies. Hence, we either describe an expenditure cut leading to a return to the baseline, or alternatively a rise in taxes that could cover the expenditure di¤erential between today's expenditure and the baseline period. (iv) For debt consolidation policies we choose a tax policy 35 to bring down debt from the presently unsustainable to a sustainable level. (v) As a rule of thumb, we identify the sustainable debt level around a baseline period. (vi) Since there is an obvious trade-o¤ between fast consolidation and the duration of the increase in the tax burden we consider two scenarios with respect to the time horizon. Starting in 2011, in the …rst scenarios we suggest a consolidation period of 10 years, while in a second scenario we consider a longer consolidation period of 15 years. (vii) In order to link to real world disputes we translate the required adjust-ment in tax-ratios into an increase in VAT (average sales tax in the U.S.). That is, we perform a simple linear computation of the contribution of each percentage point in VAT (sales tax) to the respective total government revenue-ratio and then calculate to what extent VAT must be adjusted in order to generate a total tax-ratio that supports the respective time path of consolidation. Table  2 gives the detailed numbers for each country.
Using the example of the U.S., Table 2a should be read in the following way: If the real economy has returned to long term stationary behavior (3.1% real growth, 3.01% real interest rate, 2.22% in ‡ation rate, and 2.7 capital-outputratio) the …scal regime must also return to the baseline values. For this, a de…cit consolidation and a debt consolidation are necessary. For de…cit consolidation, government disbursement must be permanently cut down to return to the baseline ratio. The value of this cut is about 7 percentage points of GDP or 938 billion US$ in absolute terms for 2011. This cut would bring down the U.S. disbursement-ratio from 39.77% in 2011 to a 32.72% in the baseline period. The primary budget target would be a de…cit, namely -1.21% of GDP, like in the baseline period. Instead of an expenditure cut the U.S. government could alternatively raise taxes by means of …ctitious permanent increase in average sales tax by 20 percentage points. 38 Further, in order to reduce the debt-ratio and implement a debt consolidation to a sustainable level of 43% of GDP the U.S. would have to increase taxes by an amount equivalent to an increase in average sales tax of 7 percentage points if the planned consolidation period is 10 years. An increase in average sales tax by 3 pc. pts is required if the planned consolidation period is 15 years.
With net debt of around 80% of GDP, the US and U.K. are likely to be close to an unsustainable trajectory. As can be seen from Table 2 the …scal regimes in both economies di¤er from their baseline period in particular because of a dramatic increase in government disbursements. Hence, in addition to tax policies to bring down debt during a consolidation period (debt consolidation), a return to the baseline …scal disbursement requires a dramatic and permanent cut in expenditure for both countries (de…cit consolidation). However, if the current expenditure level were to become the newly desired long term ratio the tax policy would have to be further adjusted substantially to raise an equivalent amount of government revenues. De…cit and debt consolidation e¤orts in the US and the U.K. may be reinforced by higher GDP growth and a more favorable interest to growth di¤erential 39 than in Germany or Japan if they can manage to return to growth rates of the baseline values. With a current net debt of slightly above 50% of GDP Germany is also above or close to a non sustainable level even for the benchmark case of a constant savings-ratio. With respect to Germany two …ndings are important. 1) Despite the Maastricht de…cit rule and despite never having drastically violated it, on average Germany has experienced a continuos increase in net debt. Even if the latest acceleration of debt was due to the 2008 crisis, the Maastricht rules do not seem su¢ cient to follow a constant net debt rule. This is apparent when looking again at Figure 4 . Most of the time, no matter if the Maastricht rule was violated or not, Germany has experienced an increase in net debt and could not match the constant net debt rule. 2) However, Germany was not too far away from the Maastricht and/or constant debt rules, and implemented reforms and raised VAT between 2003 and 2006 so that elements of a budget consolidation policy are already active. Therefore, today's consolidation measures are less severe. From the perspective of a long term de…cit policy Germany could even cut VAT by 3 pc. points. However, the debt resulting from the 2008 crisis must …rst return to a sustainable debt trajectory and hence be reduced by an increase in VAT according to the scenarios in Table 2c . Therefore, on balance, then a moderate increase in VATs would be capable of funding a return to a sustainable debt trajectory.
Japan is far from any sustainable trajectory. With a net debt-ratio of 125% of GDP and an extraordinary increase in disbursement-ratio compared to the baseline period, Japan would have to permanently cut government expenditure by 50,416 bn Yen to consolidate its budget. If Japan wanted to maintain expenditure at the current ratio the government would have to permanently raise VAT by very considerably high percentage points compared to the baseline period. For debt consolidation Japan would have to raise VAT in line with the numbers in Table 2d to run a debt consolidation program.
The results show that a considerable adjustment is required to ensure sustainability. In fact the …gures for the U.K. and the US are very close to the IMF's forecasted primary balance adjustment (see IMF Fiscal Monitor, Table  A3 .3 in the Appendix).
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In particular, for Japan but also for the U.S. and the U.K., the required actions seem so dramatic that we doubt that conventional austerity will be politically enforceable. Hence, unconventional measures will become ever more likely the longer governments hesitate to take drastic conventional action.
Unconventional Adjustment Policies: By unconventional measures we mean policies such as cutting debt by means of new legislation or in ‡ation. However, when governments consider these unconventional measures, they should be aware of the drastic e¤ects of non-anticipated in ‡ation on distortions in allocation and wealth distribution. These policies are an expropriation of nominal wealth holders. Nominal wealth holders are mostly regular less wealthy people. While nominal wealth holders will experience a loss of their real wealth, debtors and real asset holders -which are often wealthier people -gain massively from a real devaluation of debt (private and public) without a depreciation of real values of these assets. In democratic societies where governments should act in the interest of the majority we doubt that these kinds of unconventional measures are an appropriate instrument even if they enable the government to eliminate its debt and claim to stabilize the economy.
There is another unconventional measure worth discussing. As the point of departure for the recent rapid acceleration in sovereign debt was a drastic market failure in the global …nancial system, we should have a closer look at this dysfunction. The 2008 crisis revealed a massive allocative ine¢ ciency that was probably generated or at least favored by principal-agent, asymmetric information and moral hazard problems within the …nancial system. Financial instruments in these markets should improve allocative e¢ ciency and not increase information asymmetries and moral hazard. As long as we do not …nd Figure 5 : De…cit and Debt Consolidation Scenarios a design for the …nancial markets and …nancial …rms can address these kinds of distortions the economies will be at risk of experiencing another, then una¤ordable, crisis. Therefore, there should be no taboo in thinking about even unconventional new designs of the …nancial system.
Ideologies and beliefs: Government budget policies are very often discussed with a certain preconception in mind. The choice of one model family or model variation over another can have very di¤erent implications. Therefore, we would like to clearly identify the elements that are most controversial and we also evaluate brie ‡y how we believe these elements a¤ect our major …ndings. 1) We model and discuss long term developments and perspectives. We agree that macroeconomic stabilization policies may be helpful in the short term. However, there is a long term e¤ect which we focus on, and which cannot be neglected forever.
2) The choice of an OLG model with exogenous growth is a choice for neoclassical growth mechanics. The key element responsible for most resulting mechanics are the properties of an aggregate neoclassical production function and resource constraints. We follow the notion of stationary capital-ratios, long term growth rates at a given stationary level, and returns on capital that move inversely to capital-ratios. The statistics suggest that these notions do not obviously contradict the stylized facts on long term developments in the considered economies. Factor payments according to marginal productivity are regarded as a simpli…cation (not a contradiction) of a more complex real-life payment scheme.
3) A clear undervaluation of productive government activities is connected to the implicit assumption that the government does not generate a productive public input good, let alone a public stock of infrastructure. The government simply absorbs resources for whatever purpose. In the model a public infrastructure would clearly improve aggregate productivity. However, in the calibration exercise we implicitly account for this idea by assuming that the expenditure rate of the baseline period is the desired rate that may account for these kind of e¤ects. During baseline periods governments earned su¢ cient revenues but did not spend more, signaling a kind of optimal spending.
4) The neoclassical savings decision is a way to incorporate intertemporal resource decisions into a macro model. Since debt issues clearly a¤ect intertemporal allocation and distribution we choose to model this link. However, the qualitative results are not much a¤ected by this issue. Even if we assume that savings rates are independent of interest rates or constant, the main results still hold.
5) In our understanding of the model mechanics the major results in terms of the dynamic e¤ects of government de…cits are generated by pure accounting identities and resource restrictions. Additional resources cannot easily be mobilized, neither within a period nor intertemporally.
6) Even if a calibration is a rule of thumb exercise, as long as we do not see other more sophisticated calculations and discussions, our results ring alarm bells. If the world's major economies are apparently forced to increase their debt-ratios in just three years to a greater extent than in the entire three-decade period before that, something is clearly not working properly.
Summary and Conclusion
As a response to the …nancial and economic crisis in 2008 huge government de…cits in most high income economies led to a rapid accumulation of public debt. The extremely fast increase in sovereign debt may raise doubts as to the …scal sustainability of some advanced economies. This paper examines the relationship between debt dynamics, capital formation, and economic development in the four largest advanced economies, and is the …rst contribution to account for the e¤ects of the 2008 …nancial and economic crisis on debt sustainability .
We contribute to the literature on …scal sustainability by framing the problem in an OLG model with government debt, physical capital, endogenous interest rates, and exogenous growth. We demonstrate the existence of a maximum debt ratio and the described dynamics of adjustments. Debt is unsustainable if the economy is on an unstable trajectory where even a 'constant debt ratio rule' for the current debt ratio would not stabilize the economy at any positive capital ratio. The policy implications are serious. (i) In a sustainable debt regime decision makers are free to choose a desired permanent debt ratio within the limits of the sustainable regime. Policy makers must be aware of their limited choices.
(ii) Once the economy has crossed over to an unsustainable regime, freedom of action turns into pressure to react even under unfavorable conditions. Governments should establish debt ceiling rules in order to avert this kind of threat, which is the result of short term opportunistic policies.
Yet to the authors' best knowledge none of the calibration exercises performed so far have been parameterized to consider (1) the e¤ect of the 2008 …nancial crisis with a massive de…cit policy and the most recent debt accumulation, and (2) a potential sustainablity problem of the world's largest advanced economies in its aftermath. While the debt crisis has so far essentially been a problem for some smaller Southern European economies, this exercise sheds more light on the debt position of the largest advanced economies. We are aware that calibration exercises are only good for broad analysis, and have a number of shortcomings and produce no more than rules of thumb, so they are more a source of orientation than of precise predictions, yet we believe that our results are more than alarming.
For the calibration exercise we extract data from the OECD for a period of almost two decades prior to the 2008 crisis. Except for parameters describing intertemporal preferences all parameters are drawn or directly endogenously derived from the OECD database.
1) In our discussion we start with a baseline scenario that covers, as much as possible, two major ideas: (i) to describe the real economic conditions (real growth, real interest rate, capital ratio, productivity) of the four largest advanced economies, namely the Germany (as the European stability anchor), the U.S., the U.K., Japan, and that have been broadly observable in recent years (before the 2008 crisis), and (ii) to combine the characteristics of each real economy with the …scal regime that is closest to a constant debt policy during that same period.
2) With the help of the baseline scenario we discuss if these economies may be moving on unstable trajectories because they have drifted into an unsustainable sovereign debt regime. Our results suggest (i) that without an exceptional period none of the four economies under review would be able to establish a …scal regime capable of supporting a stationary debt ratio during the last two decades; (ii) that all four are likely to have crossed or are about to cross the line to an unsustainable regime. The overall results of this simple calibration exercise are therefore alarming. They call for a strong readjustment in longterm …scal activity of at least three of the four major high-income economies, namely the US, the UK, and, most urgently, Japan.
3) What changes and adjustments in de…cit policies are required to return to a stable and hence sustainable debt trajectory? The required policies will be the more dramatic the larger the di¤erence between the current debt ratio and a sustainable path and the less pronouced the stationary growth. These measures are discussed and translated into simple consolidation instruments and actions. Reaching debt ceilings requires the rethinking of de…cit and debt rules, of which the Maastricht de…cit rules are an example. In particular, for Japan but also for the US and the UK the required actions seem so painful that we have doubts that conventional austerity programs like expenditure cuts and higher taxes will be politically enforceable. As a result unconventional measures, such as new legislation to cut debt or raise in ‡ation, are more and more likely the longer the government waits with implementing drastic conventional actions.
However, even if a calibration is a rule of thumb exercise, as long as we do not see other more sophisticated calculations and discussions, our results are ringing the alarm bells. If the world's major economies are seemingly forced to increase their debt ratios in just four years to a greater extent than in the entire four-decade period before that, something is clearly not working properly.
Appendix 1: Solving the Model
Production per labor in e¢ ciency units
The output of a …rm is de…ned by the Cobb-Douglas production function
In order to determine the production in e¢ ciency units we have to compute the ratio each e¢ ciency-weighted labour input provides. Hence, we obtaiñ
with k t := K t =Y t :
Pro…t Maximization of Firms
In order to determine the input factor prices we consider the pro…t function = A(K t ) (H t ) 1 (r t + ) (K t ) w t (H t ):
Maximizing subject to L t leads to the …rst order conditions
After rearranging and using (12) we obtaiñ
Similarly, after maximizing subject to K t we obtain
After rearranging and using (12) we obtain
= k with t denoting the growth factor of output which in a potential steady state becomes equal to the product of the population growth factor (1 + n t ) and the growth factor of labor productivity (1 + " t ), such that t = (1 + " t ) (1 + n t ).
Equilibrium and Stationarity Conditions
Pure transmission of capital and bonds from generation to generation:
We assume that the old generation bequeaths the total capital K t and bonds B t with the share if the restriction is ful…lled that total bequest does not restrict full capital transfer. Therefore the income and expenditure equation becomes:
wH + K t + B t T C y + K t r t + B t r t + (1 )
General stationarity curve: For the general stationarity curve we use that b t+1 = b t and k t+1 = k t : 
